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Human rights in the Isle of 




The author considers the position under Isle of Man law prior to the implementation of the Human Rights Act 2001 and in particular whether 
references can be made to the Convention on Human 
Rights to inform the exercise of administrative as well as
o
judicial discretion.
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 2001
The Human Rights Act 2001 (Appointed Day) (No 1) Order 
2001 of the Isle of Man brought into effect certaino
provisions of the Human Rights Act 2001 of the Isle of Man 
('the Act') with effect from 1 March 2001. These 
provisions included the title of the Act, the definitions 
section for certain limited purposes and the provisions 
which confer powers to make subordinate legislation 
under the Act. It is unlikely that the substantive provisions 
of the Act will come into question before 2003.
The Isle of Man Government's intention, as was the case 
in the United Kingdom, is that there should be a lead-in time 
to allow Government Departments and Statutory Boards to 
renew all their legislation and practices and to allow for the 
training of staff. In the United Kingdom the lead-in time was 
about two years and the Isle of Man Government propose a 
similar lead-in time for the Isle of Man.
POSITION BEFORE THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE ACT
What is the position in the meantime?
Before the substantive provisions of the Act become law 
references to the European Convention will be limited to 
three main areas:
(1) Those in which it is necessary to resolve an ambiguity 
in a Manx statute;
(2) To assist if there is uncertainty in the common law of 
the Island; and
(3) To inform the exercise of a discretion.
This short note poses the following the question: is the 
subject matter in area 3 above limited to judicial discretion (as 
in O'Callaghan v Teare 1981-83 MLR 103 - 'the O'Callaghan 
case') or does it also extend to administrative discretion?
The Staff of Government Division (the Island's Court of 
Appeal) in Jones v The Queen ('the/ones case'  2 DS 2000/1) 
in judgments delivered at Douglas on 8 May 2000 stated 
(at page 8):
'Accordingly Mrs Kelly properly accepted the Attorney General's 
submissions, which we unreservedly accept, that in the absence of 
statutory incorporation of the Convention into Manx domestic 
law, reference to the Convention is limited to where such is 
necessary to resolve ambiguity in statute or uncertainty in the 
Common Law or to inform the exercise of an administrative 
discretion' (author's emphasis).
This extract was repeated by the Island's Court of Appeal 
at page 19 of their judgment in In the Matter of the Petition of 
Stephen David Galloway   'the Galloway case' (judgment given 
29 August 2000, 2 DS 2000/17). Was the Island's Court of 
Appeal correct to unreservedly accept that reference to the 
Convention can be made to inform the exercise of an 
administrative, as opposed to a judicial, discretion?
POSITION IN ENGLISH LAW PRIOR TO THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ENGLISH 
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
Prior to the Human Rights Act 1998 (Act of Parliament) 
coming into force in October 2000, English commentators 
(for example Navtej Ahluwahia & Nuala Mole, The Human 
Rights Act 1998 An Overview, p.9) indicated that the 
Convention might only be used:
'(I) As an aid to the construction of legislation in cases of 
ambiguity (e.g., R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Brind [1 991] AC 696 at 760);
(2) To establish the scope of the common law (e.g. Derbyshire 
County Council v Times Newspapers [1992] QB 770 ( at 
812, 830);
(3) To inform the exercise of judicial (as opposed to 
administrative) discretion (e.g. AG v Guardian Newspapers 
(No 2) [1987] 3 A11ER 316'.
At pages 15-16 the learned authors of Human Rights Law 
and Practice (Butterworths, 1999), Eord Eester QC and 
David Pannick QC, stated:
'Prior to the coming intojorce of the HRA 1 998, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, although an
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international treaty which binds the United Kingdom (and 
obliges the United Kingdom as a matter of international 
obligation to amend our laws and procedures where they are to be 
found to have breached the invention), therefore has a limited, 
albeit important, effect in domestic law in creating rights and 
duties in particular:
(1) Courts seek to interpret ambiguous legislation consistently 
with the Convention;
(2) Courts seek to apply the common law (where it is uncertain, 
unclear or incomplete) and exercise Judicial discretions, 
consistently with the Convention;
(3) Although public authorities, such as Ministers of the Crown, 
exercising discretionary powers have no duty to exercise such 
powers consistently with the Convention, the human rights 
context is relevant to whether the Minister or other public 
authority acted reasonably and had regard to all relevant 
considerations;
(4) Where a dispute concerns directly effective European Union law, 
the courts take account of the Convention because European 
Union law includes principles recognised by the Convention'.
In Administrative Law (7th ed., 1994), written before the 
implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Act of 
Parliament), Wade and Forsyth stated at page 496:
'Unlike most of the other states who are parties, Britain has 
failed to incorporate the Convention into domestic law, so that its 
status is that of a treaty only and complainants must undertake 
long and expensive litigation in Strasbourg. But the courts, 
though unable to enforce the Convention directly have made some 
progress towards giving effect to it indirectly. They will take it 
into account in construing statutes or regulations in cases of 
ambiguity. In one case Lord Reid said that it was hardly credible 
that Parliament or any government department would act contrary 
to it. In the Court of Appeal it has several times been held that 
regard ought to be had to the Convention as an aid to 
interpretation and in one case under the common law, where 
arguments were evenly balanced, they treated the Convention as 
decisive. Distinguished judges speaking extra-judicially have 
suggested how this policy could be carried Jurther; and in a case 
in the House of Lords Lord Griffiths acknowledged the 
responsibility the judiciary "to refuse countenance behaviour that 
threatens either basic human rights or the rule of law".'
Bennion's Statutory Interpretation (2nd ed.), stating the 
law prior to the implementation of the Human Rights Act 
1998, says at page 567:
'It follows that the Convention does not directly govern the 
exercise of powers conferred by or under an Act'.
Lord Bridge in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
('the Brind case' - [1991] 1 All ER 720, HL) stated (at 
722-23): T
'But it is already well settled that, in construing any provision 
in domestic legislation which is ambiguous in the sense that it is 
capable of a meaning which either conforms to or conflicts with
the convention, the courts will presume that Parliament intended 
to legislate in conformity with it. Hence, it is submitted, when a 
statute confers upon administrative authority discretion capable of 
being exercised in a way, which infringes any basic human rights, 
protected by the convention, it may similarly be presumed that the 
legislative intention was that the discretion should be exercised 
within the limitations, which the convention imposes. I confess 
that I found considerable persuasive force in this submission. But 
in the end I have been convinced that the logic of it isjlawed. 
When confronted with a simple choice between two possible 
interpretations of some specific statutory provision, the 
presumption whereby the courts prefer that which avoids conflict 
between our domestic legislation and our international treaty 
obligations is a mere canon of construction which involves no 
importation of international law into the domestic field. But 
where Parliament has conferred on the executive an administrative 
discretion without indicating that it must be exercised within the 
convention limits, to presume that it must be exercised within 
convention limits would be to go far beyond the resolution of an 
ambiguity ... and I cannot escape the conclusion that this would 
be a judicial usurpation of the legislative function.'
PREVIOUS REFERENCES TO THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION IN ISLE OF MAN 
LAW
The judiciary in the Isle of Man have over the years 
considered submissions in respect of the application of the 
European Convention of Human Rights in Manx law. In the 
O'Callaghan case the Staff of Government Division held that 
when the courts were exercising their sentencing discretion
o o
it was appropriate that they should adopt a policy, which 
conformed to treaty obligations as far as possible, while at 
the same time being consistent with Manx law.
In Sallis v R (1987-89 MLR 329) the Staff of 
Government Division accepted that in some cases of 
allegations of gross indecency between consenting males in 
private   and they emphasised the word some   it may be 
right for the Deemster to remind the jury that whilst the 
question of whether an act was one of gross indecency or 
not is one of fact for them to decide, they should have 
regard to views prevailing in other civilised countries, and 
in particular they should have regard to the views of the 
European Court of Human Rights.
In R v Gray (1990- 92 MLR 74) an Acting Deemster was 
unimpressed by submissions in respect of Article 6 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
'by which the Island is bound' (page 89) and also Article 
14 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil Rights. The
o
Acting Deemster dismissed these submissions as adding 
nothing to the common law position.
His Honour Deemster Kerruish, in his judgment 
delivered on the 24 July 2000 regarding In the Matter of the 
Petition of Peter Michael Bond (24 November 1999, CP 
1999/168), also dealt with submissions in respect of the
Amicus Curiae Issue 36 August 2001
European Convention on Human Rights (see also the 
chapters which the author of this note contributed to 
Solly's Government and Law in the Isle of Man (1994) Chapter 
VI, 'European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms', pages 189-2 11; Isle ofo ' r o ' J 
Man Partnership Law (1996), Chapter III, 'Nature and
Sources of Manx Law' pages 82 - 156, and pages 127-151 
re: European Convention, which endeavours to summarise 
the position prior to the Act coming into full force).
WAS THE STAFF OF GOVERNMENT 
DIVISION CORRECT IN REFERRING TO 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION 
POINT?
Were the Staff of Government Division in the Jones case 
(as repeated in the Galloway case) correct to indicate that 
the Convention could be referred to 'to inform the 
exercise of an administrative discretion'? Or should they 
have deleted 'administrative' and inserted 'judicial', or 
should they have simply added the words 'or judicial' after 
the word 'administrative'?
On Frankland (1987-89 MLR 65) principles do we treat 
the English decisions, such as the House of Lord's Brind 
case (which appear to limit the reference to judicial 
discretion rather than administrative discretion) as highly 
persuasive, or do we follow the Jones case and the Galloway 
case (are they clear decisions to the contrary) ? Should the 
Isle of Man courts follow the comments of the Judges of 
Appeal in the Jones case and the Galloway case and allow the 
Convention to be referred to 'inform the exercise of an 
administrative discretion'? Or should the Isle of Man
courts follow the comments of Lord Bridge in the Brind 
case to the effect that to do so 'would be a judicial 
usurpation of the legislative function'?
The author's own view, for what it is worth, is that we 
should follow the stance taken by our Staff of Government 
Division (the Island's Court of Appeal) in the Jones case 
and the Galloway case rather than the stance taken by Lord 
Bridge in the Brind case. We should allow reference to the 
Convention to inform the exercise of judicial and 
administrative discretion.
If allowing reference to the Convention to inform the 
exercise of administrative discretion is considered 
unacceptable, the fall back position would be to accept 
that the human rights context is relevant to whether the 
relevant body exercising the administrative discretion 
acted reasonably and had regard to all relevant 
considerations. To limit reference to the Convention to 
inform only the exercise of judicial discretion would 
appear to be an unduly restrictive stance to take.
The administrative/judicial discretion debate will be 
academic as soon as the substantive provisions of the Act 
come into operation but in the meantime the Island's 
Court of Appeal   Staff of Government Division should 
clarify the position at the earliest available opportunity. ^
Chairman, Isle oj Man Law Society's Human Rights Committee; Head of 
Commercial Department, Dickinson Cruickshank <&_&>, Advocates, Isle of Man 
(http://mm: dc. co. im)
Globalisation and private 
international law: reviewing 
contemporary local law
by Olusoji Elias
Primarily because territory necessarily features as an important basic denominator for cross-border interaction across national legal systems, there is a 
clear material affinity between private international law and 
the legal dimensions of globalisation. They both have a 
common root, firstly, in factors, characteristics and 
considerations concerning the scope of relevant laws, and
also in the context and the terminology of localism and 
externalism. The complexity and the inclusive bearing of 
globalisation pose contemporary problems, and a 
recognisable broadening of the scope of private international 
law to meet the realities of a rapidly globalising world keeps 
with world-wide trends in which trans-national laws form 
an important primary focal point, whether or not as they are
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